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Note: the frontlines aren’t super organized, but I think this is all of the substantantive ones. Theres’ also a better version of the corruption framework, but I can’t put it up.

# Framework

## Util Framework Long

Epistemology comes before all other ethical foundations because labeling things moral or immoral is just a function of our knowledge. We need to know *how* we know what right and wrong are before we can pick the best definition. **And**, a priori reasoning is impossible so the only epistemologically sound basis for Morality is experience. **Schwartz**[[1]](#footnote-1)

The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical **experience and** experimental **psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources.** The fact is that we believe that **there is no source of knowledge**, information, or evidence **apart from observation**, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that **humans are continuous with the rest of nature and** that **we rely** like other animals **on our senses to tell us how things are.** If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular **we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible.** This is an empirical claim.

**And,** all experiences are based on the badness of pain and the goodness of pleasure. **Nagel**[[2]](#footnote-2)

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that **sensory pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are.** The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just [is a] sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost **everyone takes the avoidance of** his own **pain and** the **promotion** of his own **pleasure as subjective reason**s **for action** in a fairly simple way; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why **there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized.** That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then **it is at least possible that I have a reason**, and not just an inclination, **to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove.** But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be motivated to reduce pain for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. **Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion.** Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

Since people see their own happiness as good, they must see it as good for all people **Sayre-McCord**[[3]](#footnote-3)

**In valuing** something (**my happiness** or my rational nature, say), **there must be something I see as good about it.** Whatever **that feature** is, it **cannot be** simply **it being mine** or my getting it, **since** obviously **plenty of things that are mine**, or that I do get, **are not valuable** at all.However,whatever other feature it might be will be a property potentially possessed by things that are not mine. For instance, **if what is good about my happiness** (according to me) **is how it feels, then I am committed to thinking that this same feeling, if enjoyed by someone else, is good as well**

Thus, the standard is utilitarianism.

Prefer the standard.

**First,** equality among individuals proves util. **Cummiskey[[4]](#footnote-4)**

If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? **If I sacrifice some for the sake of others,** I do not use them arbitrarily, and **I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings.** Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but **persons** also **have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others** (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. **If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings**, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

**And,** Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, my util offense outweighs theirs under their own framework

**Second,** Governments must use util. **Goodin**[[5]](#footnote-5)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. **Public officials**, in contrast, **are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates**. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all.**That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – **to choose general rules of conduct**. Knowing aggregates and averages, **they can** proceed to **calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule**. But they cannot be sure that the payoff will do to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

**And,** ought” is not just a moral obligation. People recognize valid political and rule based obligations. No dictionary defines it as just a moral obligation; rather, they define it as a general duty or rightness, so proving one type of obligation to affirm, such as a utilitarian obligation, is sufficient since ought has multiple meanings.

**Third,** the fission thought experiment proves that personal identity isn’t absolute. **Shoemaker 1**[[6]](#footnote-6)

By way of explanation, consider the case Parfit uses in support of his claim that identity is not what matters: fission (Ibid., 254–255). **Suppose both of my brain hemispheres are** functional **duplicates** of the other, **and** that each of my other two triplet brothers has suffered irreversible brain damage. **A** brilliant neuro**surgeon can transplant one of my brain hemispheres into [my triplet brothers]** each brother, and **so each** survivor (we will stipulate) **will be** fully **psychologically continuous with me** upon waking up. What has happened to me? If we lack the “no branching” clause, **we are forced to say that, because both** brothers **are psychologically continuous with me, they are both me. But then** (given the transitivity of identity) **both** survivors **would** also have to **be** identical to **each other, which seems obviously false** (although see Belzer 2005 for doubts about this assertion). So to avoid violating this transitivity requirement, we simply have to stipulate in our criterion of personal identity that, if the relations in which identity consists may hold one-many, they must obtain uniquely for identity itself to obtain. But then what has happened to me in fission? It seems I cannot survive as both, so the identity relation does not obtain between me and the survivors. In addition, there simply is no non-arbitrary reason why it should obtain between me and just one of the survivors, so the only remaining option is that I do not survive fission (see Parfit 2001, 42; see also Brink 1997b, 140–141). But is this like an ordinary case in which I don't survive, i.e., like death? Clearly not: both survivors will seem to remember my thoughts and experiences, they will fulfill intentions I had in action, they will have the same beliefs/desires/goals as me, and their characters will be exactly like mine. Indeed, it will be just as if I had survived. **Everything that matters** in ordinary survival (or nearly everything), therefore, **is preserved** in fission, **despite the fact that the identity relation is not.** What **[T]his** must **mean[s]**, then, is **that the identity relation just is not what matters** (or is not what matters very much) in survival; **instead, what matters [is]** has to consist in **psychological continuity** and/or connectedness (what Parfit calls “Relation R”). As long as that relation holds between me-now and some other person-stage — regardless of whether or not it holds one-one — what happens to me is just as good as ordinary survival. Call this the Identity Doesn't Matter (IDM) view.

This means the concept of “self ownership” and “independence” are both vacuous, because there is no such thing as an individual persons moral identity. Therefore this refutes all NCs premised in autonomy and individual choice.

This means util. **Shoemaker 2**

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. **Many** people **claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not** justified in maximizing the good **across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single,** deeply **unified person**, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if **the only justification for the different treatment** of individual lives and sets of lives **is the** further **fact [of unity], and this fact is undermined by** the truth of **reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment.** There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives and sets of lives is mistaken. If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Utilitarianism is just such a theory.**

## Util Framework Short

The standard is utilitarianism.

**First,** the fission thought experiment proves that personal identity isn’t absolute. **Shoemaker 1**[[7]](#footnote-7)

By way of explanation, consider the case Parfit uses in support of his claim that identity is not what matters: fission (Ibid., 254–255). **Suppose both of my brain hemispheres are** functional **duplicates** of the other, **and** that each of my other two triplet brothers has suffered irreversible brain damage. **A** brilliant neuro**surgeon can transplant one of my brain hemispheres into [my triplet brothers]** each brother, and **so each** survivor (we will stipulate) **will be** fully **psychologically continuous with me** upon waking up. What has happened to me? If we lack the “no branching” clause, **we are forced to say that, because both** brothers **are psychologically continuous with me, they are both me. But then** (given the transitivity of identity) **both** survivors **would** also have to **be** identical to **each other, which seems obviously false** (although see Belzer 2005 for doubts about this assertion). So to avoid violating this transitivity requirement, we simply have to stipulate in our criterion of personal identity that, if the relations in which identity consists may hold one-many, they must obtain uniquely for identity itself to obtain. But then what has happened to me in fission? It seems I cannot survive as both, so the identity relation does not obtain between me and the survivors. In addition, there simply is no non-arbitrary reason why it should obtain between me and just one of the survivors, so the only remaining option is that I do not survive fission (see Parfit 2001, 42; see also Brink 1997b, 140–141). But is this like an ordinary case in which I don't survive, i.e., like death? Clearly not: both survivors will seem to remember my thoughts and experiences, they will fulfill intentions I had in action, they will have the same beliefs/desires/goals as me, and their characters will be exactly like mine. Indeed, it will be just as if I had survived. **Everything that matters** in ordinary survival (or nearly everything), therefore, **is preserved** in fission, **despite the fact that the identity relation is not.** What **[T]his** must **mean[s]**, then, is **that the identity relation just is not what matters** (or is not what matters very much) in survival; **instead, what matters [is]** has to consist in **psychological continuity** and/or connectedness (what Parfit calls “Relation R”). As long as that relation holds between me-now and some other person-stage — regardless of whether or not it holds one-one — what happens to me is just as good as ordinary survival. Call this the Identity Doesn't Matter (IDM) view.

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If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? **If I sacrifice some for the sake of others,** I do not use them arbitrarily, and **I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings.** Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but **persons** also **have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others** (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. **If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings**, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

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## Corruption Framework

A just government is a collective actor, they act and reason through individual citizens reasoning for a common objective instead of individually. **Laurence[[10]](#footnote-10)**

It is enough that the same order displayed in collective action explanation can also be represented as a set of rational transitions justifying the actions undertaken by members of a group in light of a shared objective. In this way, whether or not there is strictly speaking a unitary knowing subject of the whole action, we can still see the actions in question as recommended by reasoning. This reasoning will not, of course, occur through the exercise of a separate practical reason possessed by the group, but rather through the reasoning of the individual members as they execute their shared objective. We might sum this up by saying that just as a collective agent can only act through the actions of its individual members, it can only know through their knowing, and reason through their reasoning.

Thus, an individual acting in an official role is distinct from that individual acting on their own. The choices that they have because of their position are owned publically, not by that official, so they need to ignore their personal interests. **Ripstein[[11]](#footnote-11)**

The structure of an official role parallels the structure of a person in a private relationship of status: an official is legally empowered to make arrangements for others, and is thereby prohibited from using his or her office for private purposes. Thus officials may neither take bribes nor award government contracts to their friends or family members. While the details of these restrictions require legal specification, their broad structure is clear: offices are for public purposes, and any power of choice they confer on their holders is public, not private. The distinction between an official’s acting within his or her mandate and outside it does not depend on the official’s attitude: legal systems can operate effectively even if many of their officials do not care about the law or justice, but only about doing their jobs and collecting their pay. The contrast between official duty and private corruption applies to such alienated officials in the same way that it applies to committed ones. The possibility of people living together in a rightful condition depends on external conduct, including external conduct within the three branches of government, rather than on any person’s attitude toward that conduct.14

Thus, the standard is minimizing political corruption. Prefer it:

1. Controls the internal link to any social good. The state needs to be able to use its means to pursue some good or prevent harm. All theories presuppose that the state has control over its institutions in order to actualize the ends it’s supposed to.

2. **Practice Rules.** Official roles only have meaning because they’re practice, which includes limitations on thir authority. Those outweigh as constitutive constraints. Corruption makes the practice defective. **Schapiro[[12]](#footnote-12)**

Whereas summary rules presuppose the existence of a well-defined context of application, the establishment of a practice imposes a new conceptual and normative structure on the context to which they are to apply. In this sense, a practice amounts to “the specification of a new form of activity,” along with a new order of status relations in which that activity makes sense.29 From the point of view of a participant, the establishment of a practice transforms an expanse of grass into “playing field,” bags on the ground into “bases,” and individuals into occupants of determinate “positions.” Universal laws come to hold a priori, for example that “three strikes make an out,” and that “every inning has a top and a bottom.” And within that new order people come to have special powers, such as the power to “strike out,” or to “steal a base.” The salient point for Rawls’ purposes is that there are constitutive constraints on the exercise of these new powers, constraints by which any participant must abide in order to make her movements count as the moves she intends them to be.

3. **Political Justice.** Political philosophy is inherently practical, so a deep metaphysical principle is not relevant. The goal of the state’s axiomatic grounding is not pure truth but the ability to motivate individuals to act together. That requires that it actually motivate individuals to act consistently with the state’s conception of justice, which are its laws. **Rawls[[13]](#footnote-13)**

Now a well-ordered society is also regulated by its public conception of justice. This fact implies that its members have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice require. Since a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception of justice is presumably stable: that is, when institutions are just (as deﬁned by this conception), those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them. One conception of justice is more stable than another if the sense of justice that it tends to generate is stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly. The stability of a conception depends upon a balance of motives: the sense of justice that it cultivates and the aims that it encourages must normally win out against propensities toward injustice. To estimate the stability of a conception of justice (and the well-ordered society that it deﬁnes), one must examine the relative strength of these opposing tendencies

4. **Promises.** State officials chose to promise the state and it’s citizens that they’d fulfill their obligations. Regardless of other commitments, promises create a new, enforceable relationship. **Hart[[14]](#footnote-14)**

The most obvious cases of special rights are those that arise from promises. By promising to do or not to do something, we voluntarily incur obligations and create or confer rights on those to whom we promise; we alter the existing moral independence of the parties' freedom of choice in relation to some action and create a new moral relationship between them, so that it becomes morally legitimate for the person to whom the promise is given to determine how the promisor shall act. The promisee has a temporary authority or sovereignty in relation to some specific matter over the other's will which we express by saying that the promisor is under an obligation to the promisee to do what he has promised. To some philosophers the notion that moral phenomena-rights and duties or obligations-can be brought into existence by the voluntary action of individuals has appeared utterly mysterious; but this I think has been so because they have not clearly seen how special the moral notions of a right and an obligation are, nor how peculiarly they are connected with the distribution of freedom of choice; it would indeed be mysterious if we could make actions morally good or bad by voluntary choice. The simplest case of promising illustrates two points characteristic of all special rights: (1) the right and obligation arise not because the promised action has itself any particular moral quality, but just because of the voluntary transaction between the parties; (2) the identity of the parties concerned is vital-only this person (the promisee) has the moral justification for determining how the promisor shall act. It is his right; only in relation to him is the promisor's freedom of choice diminished, so that if he chooses to release the promisor no one else can complain.

# Plan

## Corruption Advantage Core

Plan: The Federal Government of Mexico will require that municipalities and states pay police officers a living wage. I reserve the right to clarify.

Plan is key to stopping corruption in Mexican police. **De Rivera ‘08[[15]](#footnote-15)**

**One of the biggest challenges facing the police oversight community is how to help police reform movements in developing countries**. Bayley (20011 has written a useful guide suggesting what to do and not do, suggesting that democratic polic-ing should have the following qualities: Police must give top operational priority to servicing the needs of individual citi-zen and private games. 2. Police must be accountable to the law rather than to the government. 3. Police must protect human rights, especially those that are required for the sort of unfettered political activity that is the hallmark of democracy. A Police should be transparent in their activities. These are admirable qualities, not always found even in developed countries. **In places like** the Siam of Guerrero. **Mexico** **where** the leading cause of death is homi-cide. **drug trafficking fuels part of Mexico’s economy**, **and police officers are poorly paid, the probability of corruption is elevated**, and the implementation of transparency is much more difficult. **Police jobs** there **are not held in high esteem**, and **recruitment of high quality candidates is problematic**. This Mexican example is not unique. Anywhere, **a police culture of professionalism takes** time, highly effective leader-ship, exposure to appropriate training, and **a living wage large enough to help inhibit temptation to accept bribes.**

Low wages are the root cause of corruption **Daniel ‘12[[16]](#footnote-16)**

Part of **the power of mordida comes from** the **poverty** of so many Mexican citizens. **Local law enforcement personnel often make dish-washer wages**. **In Mexico**, **becoming a policeman is** sometimes **viewed as a job of last resort**, and **this** often **draws a type of person who is uneducated and vulnerable to bribes**. Codise County chief deputy Rod Rothrock trained a group of **police** in Agua Priem. They were poorly paid and had no previous police training. They literally didn't 'mow how to properly cuff a suspect. Almost all of them lived outside of Agua Priem and went to and from work in uniform by bus—usually a half hour each way. In addition, every day when the uniformed police left the station to go home, they had to leave their weapons locked up in the police station. They were always in danger but they **hardly made a living wage**. **To provide for their families, there was almost no choice but to take mordida**. Rothrock reports he hasn't done any training south of the border since the cartels took complete control."

Higher wages are uniquely key to stopping corruption **Liu et. al[[17]](#footnote-17)**

Police corruption results from many interconnected and mutually-reinforcing factors. Key **structural concerns such as low wages**, low advancement potential and a lack of training and equipment, and poor accountability mechanisms **increase incentives for police officers to engage in corruption**. Furthermore, these structural problems **perpetuate** both **the selection of unqualified individuals for policing positions and poor police performance**. In combination with the dangerous nature of policing in Mexico, **low wages provide little incentive for ethically and practically qualified individuals to join the police force**. 39,40 More importantly, they give those in the force little incentive to remain loyal. **Higher wages will reduce police officers’ legitimate needs for supplemental income from bribes**, help **attract better applicants for police** **positions, and encourage superior service**. Through the Mérida Initiative, the U.S. has an opportunity to leverage its influence to encourage Mexico to reform this system of police wages. Firstly, poor transparency makes it difficult to track how much of the funds given to the federal government are used to invest in local and state law enforcement. A critical step would be increasing that transparency in order to better assess these entities’ legitimate needs for more fiscal support. To help solve this problem, the U.S. should require Mexican states and municipalities, under a federal directive, to reveal where they are allocating the funds they receive as a condition for accepting the Mérida Initiative.

High-level Mexican officials agree low-pay is the largest factor on corruption **LAHT ‘15[[18]](#footnote-18)**

**Mexican authorities said** at a forum that **drug-trafficking gangs pay around 1.27 billion pesos** (some $100 million) **a month in bribes to municipal police officers** nationwide **Public Safety Secretary** Genaro Garcia **Luna** **said** that figure was calculated based on perceptions of municipal officers themselves and an analysis of a list of cops recruited by the cartels that was found during a police operation. “Organized crime pays some 1.27 billion pesos a month to municipal police, because **that’s the portion of the salary the government does not pay the officers so they can live with dignity** ,” the high-ranking official said Friday. Speaking on the final day of a meeting of the Association of Mexican Municipalities, or Ammac, held in the western port city of Puerto Vallarta, Garcia Luna said that **of the country’s** 165,510 **municipal officers** **nationwide**, just **over 20 percent earns less than** 1,000 pesos **($79) a month**, **while 60.9 percent earns no more than** 4,000 pesos **($317) monthly**.

## Corruption Internal Link

Fighting corruption is key to stopping the influence of the cartels-its impossible otherwise. **McGee et. Al ‘14[[19]](#footnote-19)**

In addition to economic underdevelopment and a dysfunctional public education system, **corruption serves** **as** the third **systemic ill contributing to cartel activity** (Figure 3). With their extensive wealth, **cartels are known to bribe** government personnel, **public officials**, and military officers (GAO 2007, 8-9). Systemic **corruption allows contraband to easily cross borders** with the help of sympathizers and agents in customs and border agencies, government offices (GAO 2009a), and possibly the military. Similarly, **corruption among police forces**, prosecutors, judicial personnel, and safety officials in penitentiary system **allow Mexican cartels to operate with impunity.** Failure to arrest, prosecute, and penalize criminals **creates a low risk environment for criminal activity**. Figure 4, the complete CLD, displays the daunting complexity of the cartel problem as we further step back to see the broader trends and issues involved with critical dynamics involved in cartel activities. This CLD shows that some of the significant drivers of the problem are systemic in nature. The influence that the cartels have gained over many aspects of the Mexican public life is a result of the complex interplay of various systemic factors that contribute to, facilitate and tolerate organized crime activities in Mexico. While individually they are important, it is the feedback between them and their overall impact on Mexican domestic environment and individual perceptions that provide the incentives, motivations, and favorable cost/benefit evaluations for cartel operations. These systemic enablers - an education system that exacerbates economic underdevelopment; **widespread corruption in critical public sectors such as police force**, judicial system, prisons and customs - **create an environment where illicit activities emerge as viable alternatives. These root issues generate a context that lacks credible deterrence from crime and that facilitates criminal organizations** to operate with impunity. As a result, **Mexico “cannot fully rely on the very institutions** — the police, customs, the courts, the prisons, even the relatively clean army — most **needed to carry [anti-cartel war] out** (Lacey 2009).”

## “Small” Cartels impact

Drug cartels undermine Mexican stability and causemassive death and stuffering **Farwell and Rohozinski 13**[[20]](#footnote-20)

Those worried about tens of thousands of innocent civilian deaths in Syria might better focus their time, energy and resources on helping a nation where tens of thousands have also died, but whose fate directly and immediately affects U.S. and Canadian security. That nation is Mexico. Since 2008, the seven main **drug cartels have emerged as an existential threat to Mexico’s future**. **Cartels** like Los Zetas, which recruit members from Mexico’s Special Forces and federal police, **behave like organized paramilitaries, not ordinary criminals**. They generate perhaps $30 to $40 billion a year in illicit profits. And the price has been horrendous. Between 2007 and 2012, around 47,000 Mexicans were killed in the drug war. Some estimate that the true toll is over 60,000. When we think of **torture, beheadings and assassination**, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia come to mind. Many Americans and Canadians would be surprised to learn that these **are commonplace in Mexico**, a country many associate with beaches and margaritas. Yet **the situation in Mexico has deteriorated so badly that one Juarez mayor** and a newspaper publisher took up residence in Texas, while one journalist **took refuge** in Canada. As neighbors, **we should be concerned**. But there’s even more to it than that: The **drug cartels pose a direct threat to American** and Canadian **security**. American media reports indicate that the cartels have a presence in Texas high schools and have even hired U.S. soldiers as hitmen. The U.S. Justice Department has indicated that the cartels have a presence in at least 230 American cities. Texas governor Rick Perry and Arizona governor Jan Brewer have long complained that violent criminals from Mexico are crossing the border and threatening American families. According to Canadian law enforcement officials, Mexican cartels are joining forces with Canadian organized crime around illicit activities including money laundering. **There are alleged ties between Mexican drug cartels and Hezbollah. There is a real threat** and danger **of** the emergence of a hemispheric criminal compact with **linkages to** broader, **more sinister networks in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East**. The challenge is not amenable to easy solutions or quick fixes. Mexican leaders remain angry that President George W. Bush retreated from his pledge to continue the ban on assault weapons. The cartels exploited the lapse to purchase AK-47s and heavy arms and adapt them into even more deadly weapons.

## Oil Shocks impact

Drug cartels undermine Mexican stability **Farwell and Rohozinski 13**[[21]](#footnote-21)

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Mexican instability causes massive global oil shocks **Moran ‘9** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

**A story receiving** more **attention** in the American media than Iraq these days **is** the **horrific drug**-related **violence across** the **northern states of Mexico**, where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption. The tales of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses? The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better. The prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so far seems remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. **With Mexico’s economy reeling and the** traditional **safety valve of** illegal **immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.** Meanwhile, **Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the U**nited **S**tates **could not do without. Should things come unglued** there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, **the shock on oil markets could be profound,** again, **sending** its **waves throughout the global economy.** Long-term, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on foreign investment. Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.

Oil shocks cause **extinction** Lendman ‘7[[23]](#footnote-23)

**With** the world's energy supplies finite, **the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near** or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we can't do without. It includes waging wars to get it**, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, **militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **an extremist US administration willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central **to** its plan is first **control**ling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with **oil** and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, **it's the US with** help from **Israel,** Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, **South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons** and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over. **Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing**, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."  Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. **There may be nothing left** but resilient beetles and bacteria **in the wake of a nuclear holocaust** meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

## Afghan Impact

**Mexican drug networks fund Afghanistan cartels**

HOLT 11

[staff writer at the New American, citing Edgardo Buscaglia, investigator and fellow at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico Kelly, "Mexican Cartels Buy Afghan Heroin — Drug Wars Claim 507 in 14 Days," The New American, http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/north-america/item/10622-mexican-cartels-buy-afghan-heroin-E28094-drug-wars-claim-507-in-14-days, January 18, 2011, DD]

According to Borderland Beat (BB) Jan. 5, Mexican drug cartels have formed elaborate and strategic alliances with Middle Eastern drug traffickers, and those supply chains are also being used for arms trade and money laundering. BB obtained the report from El Universal, a major Mexican newspaper, and added that Mexican groups are also making inroads into European Union markets. Ninety percent of the world's heroin supply comes from Afghanistan, and the shipments destined for Canada and the U.S. are very profitable to criminal groups in Mexico. Edgardo Buscaglia, investigator and fellow at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, told El Universal that Mexican drug traffickers establish business alliances with gangs in places such as Afghanistan and Turkey and operate like multinational emissaries. With bases of operation in Mexico, the groups work on an international level "to establish contacts and place operatives that can deal with the Turkish and Indian criminal organizations in order to facilitate the production and sale of drugs," specifically heroin. Buscaglia explained, It is not as if [Joaquín] El Chapo Guzmán [Loera] himself travels to Turkey; it is up to his emissaries to maintain good relations in that country. They keep the flow of heroin packages and money that belongs to the Sinaloa cartel moving to their appropriate destinations. Money and heroin make [sic] its way to Chicago, or New York. It is like the concept of outsourcing labor: the Mexican cartels receive the product from their overseas suppliers and they distribute the merchandise locally. Joaquin Guzman-Loera, known as El Chapo (Shorty), heads the international drug trafficking organization known as the Sinaloa cartel, named after the Mexican State of Sinaloa on the country’s west coast. Rated by Forbes as one of the richest and most powerful people in the world, El Chapo is Mexico’s top drug kingpin. Buscaglia continued, The Mexican groups arrive to the Turkish and Afghan markets with contacts established by emissaries or companies where cartel members hold minor positions. Often, the exporters themselves come with the credentials of being overseas suppliers and representatives of people in the business of illicit services. When the heroin bound for the North and Central American markets arrives, these emissaries often exchange drugs for arms, or for other items. Nothing is out of the question, it really just depends on the region.

**That leads to Afghanistan instability and terrorism.**

INKSTER 12

[Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Drugs: A war lost in Afghanistan", Foreign Policy, ,  http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/29/drugs\_a\_war\_lost\_in\_afghanistan, May 29th, 2012, DDA]

The May 20 NATO summit in Chicago was dominated by the issue of Afghanistan. Amidst all the talk about withdrawing international combat troops by 2014, funding the Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014, and a doubtful political settlement with the Taliban, one subject was absent from the formal agenda: drugs. Yet in few other countries is the drugs trade so entrenched as it is [entrenched] in Afghanistan. Accounting for between one-quarter and one-third of the national economy, it is an integral part of the insecurity blighting Afghan life for the past 30 years. Debate may continue for years as to whether the Western intervention in Afghanistan has made the world safer or more insecure in the post-9/11 era. But it has not only done nothing to reduce global supplies of illicit opium; rather, it has made the problem worse. The international drugs-control regime, in place since the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs came into effect, rests on prohibiting use in consumer countries and reducing supply in producer states. In Afghanistan, the source of around 60 per cent of the planet's illicit opium and 85 per cent of heroin, the latter objective may never be achieved to any meaningful degree. The boom years for Afghan poppy cultivation began in the 1970s, thanks to political instability in Southeast Asia's fertile 'Golden Triangle' and bans on the crop in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. The Soviet invasion in late 1979 gave local warlords an incentive to plant opium poppies to fund their insurgency against Moscow. In the three decades since, with few other sources of income, opium production has come to provide for up to half a million Afghan households. The poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant plant, much easier for farmers to grow than saffron and more profitable than wheat. Both have been offered as alternative crops, but with only limited take-up. The criminal networks that have sprung up around the drugs trade provide farmers with seeds, fertiliser and cash loans; in short they offer an alternative welfare system. The principal growing regions, the southern Pashtun-dominated provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, are also Taliban strongholds. For all these reasons, NATO efforts to eradicate opium - either by aerial spraying or manually- have alienated the population. Indeed, they have often had to be abandoned in the face of popular resistance. Crop disease did more to reduce opium production in 2010 than NATO's counter-narcotics strategy. The United Nations recently reported there had been a 61 percent rebound in opium production in 2011, and prices were soaring. This is a worrying trend, which seems set to continue after NATO troops leave. Drug seizures, while rising, still account for less than 5% of opium produced. As a general rule, the United Nations estimates, law-enforcement agencies need to interdict about 70% of supplies to make the drugs trade less financially attractive to traffickers and dealers. In any circumstances, this is an extremely challenging objective. In the large swathes of Afghanistan where the central government and security forces wield no control, it is completely unrealistic. Meanwhile, no major trafficker has yet successfully been prosecuted due to a widespread culture of impunity. Alternative approaches have been proposed. Most recently, in May 2012, Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rakhimov proposed that opium should be purchased directly from Afghan farmers to either be used in the pharmaceutical industry or to be destroyed. He also called on other countries to do the same in a move he deemed essential to fight drug trafficking and narcotics-fuelled terrorism. But this option was tried in 2002 when the United Kingdom had the lead on narcotics reduction, and had to be abandoned in the face of evidence that the purchasing programme constituted a perverse incentive to increase production. Licit production of opium for medical purposes may be a long-term option for Afghanistan, but not while current conditions of high insecurity and pervasive corruption persist. In the West, the drugs scourge is mostly thought about in terms of the lives lost, opportunities wasted and the social disruption created through addiction. In fragile and impoverished nations such as Afghanistan, drugs create a shadow state, fuelling institutional corruption, instability, violence and human misery. The Taliban, which banned the planting of opium in 2001, was deriving an estimated U.S. $125 million per year from the business by 2009. It has been an equally important revenue stream for former warlords whose inclusion in the administration of President Hamid Karzai NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has done little to oppose. Such individuals have a powerful vested interest in state weakness to the obvious detriment of good governance and institution-building. And all these actors are likely to maximise revenues from opium production in the run-up to the 2014 NATO/ISAF drawdown to hedge against an uncertain future. A trade in which so many have vested interests will never be unwound simply or swiftly. What drives it is its huge profitability, a consequence of continuing Western demand. No-one can confidently predict the consequences of changing the drugs prohibition regime. The current approach has not achieved the 1961 Single Convention's objectives. But has had the unintended consequence of perpetuating and increasing corruption and instability in parts of the world least equipped to deal with the consequences. Perhaps our collective experience in Afghanistan should serve as the basis for a serious rethink of global drugs policy? This would involve a cost/benefit analysis of current policies, scenario planning of the impact of alternative approaches and a much greater focus on demand reduction in consumer states. The issue of narcotics [is one of] needs to be taken out of the silo it currently inhabits and looked at in the wider context of international security and development.

**Afghan instability goes nuclear – Indo-Pak tensions and Iran**

RUBIN 11

[Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post, , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat\_b\_891178.html, July 7th, 2011, DDA]

Yet many of the underlying sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an American withdrawal. In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other [there is] -- the United States must take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode [and cause]. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region -- potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise in importance. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. The key here is to leave in a way that promotes regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the [there are] deep strategic insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.

# Frontlines

## A2 CPS

### A2 Legalize Pot

Legalization strengthens drug cartels influence and creates grey markets

Felbab-Brown 2010 [[24]](#footnote-24)

But, even if legalization did displace the DTOs from the marijuana production and distribution market in Mexico, they can hardly be expected to take such a change lying down. Rather, they may intensify the violent power struggle over remaining hard-drug smuggling and distribution. (Notably, the shrinkage of the U.S. cocaine market is one of the factors that precipitated the current DTO wars.) Worse yet, the DTOs could intensify their effort to take over other illegal economies in Mexico, such as the smuggling of migrants and other illegal commodities, prostitution, extortion, and kidnapping, and also over Mexico’s informal economy – trying to franchise who sells tortillas, jewelry, clothes on the zócalo -- to mitigate their financial losses. They are already doing so. If they succeed in franchising the informal economy and organizing public spaces and street life in the informal sector (40% of Mexico’s economy), their political power over society will be greater than ever. Nor would law enforcement necessarily become liberated to focus on other issues or turn less corrupt: The state would have to devote some resources to regulating the legal economy and enforcing the regulatory system. Corruption could well persist in a legal or decriminalized economy. In Brazil, after drug possession for personal use was decriminalized, the deeply corrupt police did not clean up. Instead, they often continue to extort users and franchise pushers by threatening to book users for greater amounts than personal limits unless they pay a bribe or buy from their pushers. Additionally, a gray marijuana market would likely emerge. If marijuana became legal, the state would want to tax it – to generate revenues and to discourage greater use. The higher the tax, the greater the opportunity for the DTOs to undercut the state by charging less. The narcos could set up their own fields with smaller taxation, snatch the market and the profits, and the state would be back to combating them and eradicating their fields. Such gray markets exist alongside a host of legal economies, from cigarettes, to stolen cars, to logging. Often, as in the case of illegal logging alongside legal concessions, such gray markets are highly violent, dominated by organized crime, generating corruption, and exploitative of society.

Cartels shift into more violent markets makes them comparably worse post plan.

Felbab-Brown No Date**[[25]](#footnote-25)**

1:08 Comment From Dale: What impact do you think the legalization of drugs, such as California's vote this November on marijuana, would have on drug violence in Mexico? Some people are saying it could drastically reduce violence in Mexico. 1:09 Vanda Felbab-Brown: The legalization question entails two different parts: one is what if the US/California legalizes, the second one is what if Mexico legalizes. And indeed, the voices for the legalization of marijuana in Mexico are growing, and include, for example, former President Vicente Fox. 1:11 Vanda Felbab-Brown: Countries may have a good reason to legalize. These could include shifting the focus of law enforcement from users to organized crime or better using public health tools to deal with addiction rates (though legalization is likely to increase use to some extent; how much is the big and difficult to estimate issue) or with secondary public health problems. 1:12 Vanda Felbab-Brown: But there are good reasons to be skeptical that legalization in either the US or Mexico would reduce the violence. In fact, it can make it worse. Indeed, Mexico's legalization - if it were to take place -- would be more viable if increase of law enfrocement capacity and the suprpession of violence and capacity to corrupt or intimidate the state and society took place. 1:12 Vanda Felbab-Brown: Why? 1:15 Vanda Felbab-Brown: There are reasons to doubt that the DTOs would simply go bankrupt or just take the loss of up to 60% of their income lying down. Instead, they would try to develop their own marijuana fields in areas that the state in Mexico does not control or where its presence is limited & impose smaller taxes to undercut legal production in Mexico or in the US. But if either place legalized, imposing strong taxes would be one way to mitigate the increase in consumption -- in the same way that cigarettes are treated, example, thus setting an opportunity for a grey/illegal economy along side the legal one - just as we have w/ stolen cars or smuggled cigarettes. 1:17 Vanda Felbab-Brown: The DTOs would also intensify their struggle -- often violent over the smuggling of other illegal commodities, such as other drugs - cocaine and meth for example- and undocumented migrants. And very dangerously, they'd be even more motivated than now to take over the informal economy, franchise it, and extort the legal economy. All of which would keep their money flows and could greatly increase their political power while not reducing violence. 1:18 Vanda Felbab-Brown: Legalization is not a panacea. It is not an escape from the institutional development of its law enforcement that mexico needs to do, nor from devising a social policies that integrates into the state and its formal institutions the vast segments of the population that still persists in poverty and its marginalized in its social access and advancement, These mexicans need to come to see that hope and better future lies with the mexican state, not outside it.

Legalization doesn’t undercut cartel profits—only causes diversification which is net-worse.

Bender ‘13

Steven, Professor, Seattle University School of Law., “JOINT REFORM?: THE INTERPLAY OF STATE, FEDERAL, AND HEMISPHERIC REGULATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA AND THE FAILED WAR ON DRUGS,” 6 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 359 (2013).

Gauging the effect of U.S. legalization requires some sense of the economic importance of marijuana to the Mexican drug cartels. Unfortunately, the nature of the beast of an illegal enterprise with diffuse money laundering throughout the hemisphere is that **estimates of revenues vary widely**, both **as to the dollar amount of overall revenues and the percentage role that marijuana plays in cartel proceeds** from a variety of drugs. No doubt by any measure those revenues are enormous, with the swing in estimated annual revenue to Mexican cartels ranging from one estimate of $80 billion to a U.S. government estimate of $13.8 billion-with $8.5 billion of that revenue coming from marijuana and the vast amount coming from U.S. sales.'74 According to this **government estimate**, marijuana comprises more than 60% of cartel revenue, with the remainder coming from cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking, as well as other illicit drugs and activities. 75 As I speculated in Run for the Border, if this estimate is accurate, legalization of marijuana should have a "cataclysmic effect" on the Mexican cartels,' 76 allowing cross-border enforcement to better focus on remaining (and more dangerous) illicit drugs for which U.S. demand is less pervasive. Presumably, the south-of-the-border violence might ultimately ease as the cartels succumb to this economic squeeze. Yet **there are many reasons to be less optimistic about the impact of state legalization on Mexican trafficking**, even if that reform takes hold nationally. First, some commentators discount the estimate that marijuana plays such a key role in cartel revenues, with one commentator suggesting **a more accurate figure** falls in the range of 15-to-26%.'77 Having become the gateway for illicit drugs from South and Central America into the United States, Mexican cartels might also send their product elsewhere, **such as Canada or within Mexico**,"' redouble their efforts to export drugs that remain illicit in the United States, such as cocaine and methamphetamine, or concentrate on expanding demand for these illicit drugs as cartels did within Mexico when enhanced U.S.-border enforcement prompted them at times to liquidate their inventory to Mexican users.'79 Presumably, legalization within the United States that leaves minors unable to purchase marijuana lawfully might reserve some of that illicit market to cartels, yet the likelihood is that, as with alcohol, this demand would be supplied through fake identification or by friends and relatives purchasing lawful marijuana for minors. Some commentators have looked to the tobacco market and speculated that should government tax legal marijuana too steeply, an illicit market might emerge,"'s perhaps to be supplied by the cartels rather than by licensed domestic producers operating outside the law. Still, given the history of spraying of illicit marijuana crops with toxic chemicals, the lesser environmental policing in Mexico, and the reality that some marijuana has been smuggled, while soaked in gasoline or perfume, in such unsanitary conveyances as the inside of a full septic tank truck,'8' presumably most U.S. users would be willing to pay extra for the assurance of some quality and safety control over the production of legalized marijuana. Surely, too, the cost of bribes that divert a fair share of cartel revenue is an expense that lawfully produced marijuana need not duplicate. Most alarmingly, however, Mexican drug cartels of late have augmented their drug profits with **other enterprises** for which their infrastructure of vast capital, weaponry, manpower, and graft is well suited. These sidelines include kidnapping the family members of the wealthy for ransom,'82 trafficking undocumented immigrants and sex workers into and within the United States,'83 and robbing undocumented immigrants, whether from Mexico or Central America, who aim to reach U.S. employers.'84 **The most ominous scenario ahead is one in which the drug cartels expand these other ventures to replace marijuana revenues.** Immigration is driven and limited by job opportunities available within the United States and thus depends on labor demand. Therefore, cartels searching for replacement revenue presumably would be drawn to expand their kidnappings or their role in illicit sex markets, **such as those for underage prostitutes**.'85 Overall, then, the impact of legalization on cartel revenues, and the surging violence within Mexico, is **hard to predict.**

#### Africa Da

Rural farmers can’t compete with the cannabis industry post legalization – the aff cuts off their major source of income.

Zurayk, 13 – Professor at the Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences and director of the Interfaculty Graduate Environmental Sciences Program at the American University of Beirut (Rami, "Should farmers just say no?", Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems and Community Development Vol. 4, www.agdevjournal.com/attachments/article/401/JAFSCD\_Zurayk\_Column\_Cannabis\_Dec-2013.pdf)

These specificities set aside, it appears that cannabis production abides by the same economic principles as any other commodity traded in capitalist markets. Its production requires labor and capital investments, and its pricing obeys the law of supply and demand. It is channeled through an economic value chain that is just as implacable. The only reason its cultivation is still profitable for small farmers in the South is its illegality: it does not have to compete yet with industrially farmed agricultural commodities that have benefited from direct or indirect farm subsidies. But this is rapidly changing. As the U.S. legalizes production and the new pot barons (Newsweek, 2012; Fortune, 2013) find their places in Wall Street offices, many Southern countries such as Uruguay are starting to follow suit in order to carve themselves a share of a promising global market. One cannot help wonder about the fate of the small farmers as cannabis enters the global commodities regime. Will legalizing production benefit them by removing the sword of Damocles under which they operate and freeing them from the hold of cartels? Some small cannabis farmers are concerned that legalization will invite “safe” capital investments by large corporations and that they will lose the only edge they now possess: their willingness to take risks. For regions such as the Moroccan Rif or the Lebanese Bekáa, and in the absence of any viable alternatives, these changes are bound to cause further depeasantization and to deepen poverty. Small producers sought refuge in illegality as they gave up on governments that have been incapable of offering support to their citizenry, and after having witnessed the repeated failure of crop replacement programs. The legalization process may now breach this last line of defense. These presumptions bring about an important question: Can small farmers exist within a legality that is imposed on them by a power architecture in which they do not participate? For those among us who are interested in political ecology and are concerned about the fate of small farmers, this new agrarian question must become an urgent research priority.

The cannabis economy is key to African stability

Chouvy and Laniel, 07 –\* PhD, Geographer and Research Fellow at CNRS \*\* scientific analyst in drug supply reduction at the EMCDDA, former researcher at the Geopolitical Drug Watch (Pierre-Arnaud and Laurent, "Agricultural drug economies: cause or alternative to intra-state conflicts?", Crime, Law and Social Change Vol. 48, p. 133)

Nevertheless, cannabis production in Africa may provocatively yet adequately be thought of as a possible “alternative to development”, where the cannabis economy enables many African farmers to make up for the underdevelopment that they have been faced with for several decades. The cannabis economy would thus contribute to maintaining a certain level of stability. At least, it helps guarantee a socio-economic status quo in many places. Based on the few studies available, it may be estimated that illegal cannabis production in sub-Saharan Africa has boomed over the last 25 years, due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. This increase may be explained – at least in part – by the deterioration of national economic situations and the eruption of armed conflicts, since falling living standards and war stimulate both demand and supply of cannabis in Africa south of the Sahara. A significant proportion of the African population views marijuana as a stimulant that helps to increase performance and endurance at work or to “get courage” in dangerous situations. As a result of this “utilitarian” social representation of cannabis, it is highly likely that the number of cannabis consumers and the amounts of cannabis consumed have strongly increased in Africa since the 1980s, when the continent entered a series of crises leading to a considerable hardening of living conditions. The survival strategies implemented by Africans have frequently implied increasing individual workloads, and it is probable that many people have resorted to the “utilitarian” effects of marijuana in order to cope with the extra efforts required to survive, especially since retail prices for marijuana are generally low [17] . Starting in the late 1980s and well into the 1990s, another phenomenon has stimulated the demand for cannabis in Africa–war. Although, as far as is known there are no studies on the subject, there is little doubt that cannabis use is extremely widespread among African fighters, most of whom are young males and child soldiers. The mushrooming of violent conflicts in Africa has led to more African fighters using cannabis in search of it “utiltarian” effects on courage and endurance. In addition to increased domestic demand for marijuana, other factors have contributed to an expansion of the agricultural production of cannabis south of the Sahara. The fall in prices of licit agricultural raw materials on world markets, the deregulation implemented in many sectors, especially agriculture, and ecological setbacks have often resulted in a very sharp drop in the revenue of many players in the agricultural as well as the trade and transport sectors. State coffers, and the civil servants that informally “tax” economic activities, have also suffered a loss of income due to the crisis of agriculture. Because cannabis can adapt to a wide range of environmental settings, even to degraded or naturally poor quality soil, it may be grown on lands unsuitable for other crops. Given this “performance”, it may be integrated into agricultural production systems practically regardless of the agro and economic criteria normally governing them, namely access to land, capital and workforce. This means that cannabis cultivation is accessible to a wide range of farmers and, under present conditions, it seems to be imposing itself as an alternative crop of prime importance in West Africa as well as in Central Africa and Southern Africa [18] . Generally speaking, cannabis production in Africa is more of an economic necessity than a strategic one since little revenue from cannabis is used for financing armed conflicts, unlike opium in Afghanistan and Burma, and coca in present-day Colombia. Cannabis certainly has a role in African conflicts, but probably less as a financial resource than as a stimulant for individual fighters [19] . It seems clear that development of cannabis cultivation in sub-Saharan Africa is more a consequence of the continent’s economic, political and ecological problems than one of its causes.

African economic growth key to global economic growth

[and a bunch of other stuff – global warming + AIDS + deforestation]

STETTER 2009 (Ernst, Secretary General of Federation for European Progressive Studies, “Why Africa matters! – The economic crisis and Africa,” Contribution to the Shadow GN 2009, February 4 and 5, http://www.feps-europe.eu/fileadmin/downloads/globalisation/090204\_Stetter\_Africa.pdf)

If there is no doubt that Africa is endowed with abundant natural resources, it is also true that Africa is still struggling to address the multiple challenges facing the continent, this includes poverty, under-development, protracted conflicts, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, tuberculosis and malaria. It has been suggested that all over Africa, poverty is a common denominator and it is not surprising that people’s immune systems have been damaged. Reports on Africa’s HIV/AIDS pandemic have all come to the conclusion that HIV/AIDS on the continent is closely associated to poverty. It is clear that the absence of technological investment and the contemning human resource capacity has prevented Africa from making optimal use of its abundant resources for the benefit of its people. Nevertheless, the new scramble for natural resources in the continent is likely to create a new awareness of the geopolitical importance of the African region. Therefore, Africa remains a critical partner for the world’s economic viability. However, for Africa to benefit more from its vast natural resources it must be finally enabled to add value to these products rather than export them raw to Europe and elsewhere in the developed world. Africa needs to be helped in manufacturing value-added products that yield higher profit and income to African economies. In addition, there are, at least, five significant factors that provide a plausible explanation as to why Africa matters, especially concerning Europe: Firstly, it is the history of Africa and its relationship with Europe. The history of Africa has been a history of integration into the European economy and markets. Therefore, Africa has historically held a significant place in the European economy, trade and investments. If Africa matters to Europe it matters also to the globalised world. Secondly, there is also the inherent link between environment and sustainable development. While the history of Africa and its integration into the European economy is clearly defined by historical circumstances, the environmental aspects are not clearly discernible. Environmentally, Africa matters to the world because it provides the largest capacity in the world necessary for maintaining equilibrium in the biosphere and avoid further depletion of the ozone layer. At the same time the raid of depletion of Africa’s biodiversity including its tropical forests, medicinal plants remain threatened by the levels of poverty on the continent. Africa’s most prevailing source of energy is biomass which means depletion and an exponential raid of its forestation. If this is left to continue, the World will suffer serious climate change which is likely to erode its socio-economic prosperity and a consequent negative impact to its population. This is an area which needs a strong partnership with the rest of the world, to protect its environment and avoid further depletion of the ozone layer. Thirdly, Africa matters because it still provides easy market access to Europe, the US and China and can give, in some cases, extraordinary investment opportunities with high rates of return. With the changing political climate in the continent towards democracy, respect for the rule of law and protection of human and people’s rights the investment climate in Africa could rapidly change. The historical and cultural links, geographical proximity, and deep knowledge and understanding of the continent gives international European investors a comparative advantage over Northern America and Asia, including China. With these investments the average rate of growth in Africa has been increasing most significantly in most African countries ranging from 3% to 7% in many countries during recent years. The income disparities in the continent have been narrowing and the purchasing power parity increasing. This, coupled with the population of the continent, provides a market with huge potential especially for European goods. Indeed, any visitor to Africa would quickly realize that there is still a very significant quantity of European products traded in the continent. However, if you are in Europe you can hardly see the presence of African products on the market. This is mainly because Africa cannot compete in the European market either because of European subsidies or other protectionist measures that stifle Africa’s competitiveness and ability to sell in the European market. This problem needs to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of African-European partnership. Fourthly, Africa matters because of its abundance nature of human resources which provided the back-bone of industrialisation in Europe. Africa is a rich continent and not as poor as it is depicted elsewhere in the world. Africa is richly endowed with mineral reserves. The continent ranks first in terms of the amount of global reserves of bauxite, chromites, cobalt, diamond and gold. It also ranks first in terms of palladium, phosphates, platinum group metals, titanium minerals, vanadium and zircon. Africa was, and still is, among the world’s largest exporters. An ecological survey realised by the mineral industries of Africa has estimated that production in Africa alone accounts as much as 80 % of the world’s platinum group metals, 55% of chromites, 49 % of the palladium, 45% of the vanadium and up to 55 % of the world’s gold and diamond. Moreover, Africa has emerged as a critical exporter of cheap and skilled labor that has been instrumental in moving Europe’s economy forward.

Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### A2 UBI (Analytic)

1. Perm, do both: They aren’t mutually exclusive, cops can get a living wage and also get payments from the federal government, no reason its impossible.

2. [If cp is just for cops] Perm, do the cp: The cp is a living wage, since only cops get it is no different than a payment for being a cop. Thus, the federal government functionally becomes their employer since they are paying cops for doing their jobs. Plan never specified that municipal governments pay the living wage.

2. Cp doesn’t solve, the Liu evidence says specifically that it's the incentives a living wage provides and the fact that a living wage encourages better people to become cops. UBI doesn’t solve that since it doesn't change the salary given to a cop, which is uniquely key for things like respect, incentives, and making the job appealing.

3. Always a risk of a solvency deficit. I have evidence specific to a living wage, saying that would solve, from qualified authors who know what they’re talking about. You have an assertion by you, always more likely that the authors are right.

**AT Oportunidades/CCT CP**

Perm: Do both. There is no reason why we can’t pay police officers living wage and offer CCTs.

Perm: DO the aff then the CP. The aff will stop corruption better than the

Oportunidades will fail because:

1. People can’t afford to go to the doctor, a condition of the payment, and insurance doesn’t solve either. **Luhby 13[[26]](#footnote-26):**

Some 80 million people, around 43% of America's working-age adults, didn't go to the doctor or access other medical services last year because of the cost, according to the Commonwealth Fund's Biennial Health Insurance Survey, released Friday. That's up from 75 million people two years ago and 63 million in 2003. Not surprisingly, those who were uninsured or had inadequate health insurance were most likely to have trouble affording care. But 28% of working-age adults with good insurance also had to forgo treatment because of the price. Nearly three in 10 adults said they did not visit a doctor or clinic when they had a medical problem, while more than a quarter did not fill a prescription or skipped recommended tests, treatment or follow-up visits. One in five said they did not get needed specialist care. And 28% of those with a chronic condition like hypertension, diabetes, heart disease and asthma who needed medication for it reported they did not fill prescriptions or skipped doses because they couldn't afford to pay for the drugs. Even those with coverage find themselves shelling out more for deductibles and co-payments. The share of Americans with deductibles greater than $1,000 more than tripled between 2003 and 2012, reaching 25%. "Costs of health care have gone up faster than wages," said David Blumenthal, president of The Commonwealth Fund. The survey also found that 84 million people, nearly half of all working-age adults, went without health insurance for a time last year or had such high out-of-pocket expenses relative to their income that they were considered under-insured. That's up from 81 million in 2010 and 61 million in 2003. One bright spot in the report is that fewer young adults, those ages 19 to 25, were uninsured. The share fell to 41% in 2012, down from 48% two years earlier. That's due in large part to the Affordable Care Act, which allows young adults to stay on their parents insurance until age 26. All of those numbers should improve going forward as more health reform provisions take effect in 2014 -- primarily the state-based insurance exchanges, which are intended to offer affordable plans to those without work-based coverage. The Affordable Care Act, better known as Obamacare, will provide more coverage and cost protections, said Sara Collins, the study's lead author. Insurance plans offered through the state exchanges have to cover a suite of "essential" benefits, including maternity care and mental health services. They also limit the insured's out-of-pocket payments to no more than 40% of expenses.

2. People can’t afford to send their kids to school because they need the kids to work. [WHY IS THERE NO CARD FOR THIS INTERNET]

**AT Weder** **and Rijckeghem (Wages don’t solve corruption without increasing in drastic and infeasible ways)**

**Turn:**  Weder and Rijckeghem support and agree with the plan. **Abed and Gupta[[27]](#footnote-27):**

In Chapter 3, Van Rijckeghem and Weder find that an increase in civil service salaries in relation to those paid in the manufacturing sector has a favorable impact on the corruption index. Civil service wages are also highly correlated with measures of rule of law and quality of bureaucracy. A related issue is whether government officials responsible for fiscal management of a country should be paid bonuses, particularly when public sector wage levels are relatively low. Chand and Moene examine a country case in Chapter 4 and analyze the circumstances under which bonus payments to tax officers can promote less corrupt outcomes. They further contend that this strategy is not sufficient: corruption at higher levels of government also needs to be contained--a strategy that would entail reforming the role of the state as suggested by Tanzi (Chapter 2).

**AT Wages Don’t Solve Corruption**

1. The only way to successfully combat corruption is through wages. **Becker and Stigler[[28]](#footnote-28)**:

The fundamental answer is to raise the salaries of enforcers above what they could get elsewhere, by an amount that is inversely related to the probability of detection, and directly related to the size of the bribes and other benefits from malfeasance. A difference in salaries imposes a cost of dismissal equal to the present value of the difference between future earnings stream in enforcement and in other occupations. This cost can more than offset the gain from malfeasance.

Prefer my evidence because Becker and Stigler, quite literally, wrote *the* book on corruption and wages, and are quoted in just about every study relating to the topic. There is no better source on this subject, end of story.

**AT Svensson (Wages don’t solve without a third party to monitor corruption levels)**

1. Prefer my ev.- it is specific to Mexican police this is just about corruption in general.
2. This ev. Is really unclear- it says “third part regulation” but that could mean anything- give them zero credence here.
3. No warrant as to why I can’t just fiat their enforcement.

AT Centralization CP

1. Perm do both- they don’t compete. Plan says “municipalities and states will pay a living wage to police officers”. Doesn’t specify to state or municipal police officers. Here’s a solvency advocate: **Esparza no date[[29]](#footnote-29)**

**This** study **does not claim that** in all cases **centralization of police is** a valid solution or **the only reform required to address increased criminal violence in Mexico** and Latin America. Of course, improving recruitment standards, increasing quality of training, establishing civilian oversight, **increasing pay** and benefits,as well as empowering the community to work with **[for] police** in community policing programs are **[is] important to any policing system.** The claims of this paper are limited by the data. The data does not support the Ostrom thesis linking decentralized police with better service, and instead it found that centralized police perform better, thereby adding credence to the assertions that police centralization would help rather than harm the security situation in Mexico.

1. Perm do the aff then the CP- pay a living wage until CP goes through.
2. Perm, do both. There can still be a requirement to pay a living wage, even if no one gets that living wage. The cp isn’t therefore mutually exclusive and can’t be net beneficial if no one is getting the living wage, since there can’t be a disad to something that doesn't happen.
3. CP is impractical, terrible politics, and an incentive for protest. Smith 14[[30]](#footnote-30)

Second, Peña Nieto has proposed **closing down Mexico’s 1,800 municipal police forces** and replacing them with stronger state forces. Again, this **appears completely impractical. In 2009, the PAN tried to do something similar by creating a unified police structure. The effort “[failed completely](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/27/mexico-violence-idUSL2N0TH14N20141127" \t "_blank)**,” according to security expert Alejandro Hope.At the same time, **there is no evidence that state police forces are any less corrupt than their municipal counterparts. Organized crime has infiltrated every level of the Mexican police**. Over the past decade, competition between rival drug gangs has often materialized as [firefights between the opposing corrupt police forces](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j36g0WkTEs4" \t "_blank).Beyond the impossibility of implementation, Peña Nieto’s proposals also demonstrate just how out of touch the PRI has become. **Mexicans** do not see the solution in greater centralization. They **distrust the president, the congress, the governors, and the military just as much as the corrupted municipal leaders.** Ayotzinapa has only cemented this cynicism. Protestors point to the military forces, who stayed in their barracks while the Iguala police kidnapped the students; they point to the Guerrero governor who tried to link the students to organized crime; and they point to Peña Nieto, who put handshaking events with Prince Charles and the Chinese premier before the needs of the Ayotzinapa parents. If Ayotzinapa has taught Mexicans anything, it is that **what is needed is not more centralization but less.** Over the past two months, civil **society has taken to the streets to demand justice** and truth. And in Guerrero, local citizens have linked up with representative civilian defense units to search the mountains around Iguala for more mass graves. **Until Mexico’s authorities seek to**[**harness this civil mobilization**](http://www.voicesofny.org/2014/11/mexican-protests-time-different/)—for example, by instituting greater civil oversight of the police, a functional transitional justice policy, and perhaps even an effective truth, justice, and reconciliation commission—**the protests will continue.**

1. **CP is infeasible, gives too much power to the already corrupt federal government, and can’t solve corruption. Althaus 13**

One big problem is that the so-called Pact for [Mexico](http://www.insightcrime.org/component/tags/tag/9-mexico" \t "_blank) -- **the tri-partisan agenda** that guided much of the congressional reform -- **has collapsed, and there is no guarantee of support from opposition parties**. With Peña Nieto’s opponents smelling blood in the water, the president's proposal may be dead on arrival. **Should anything pass, it** may well **be a[n]** watered-down **imitation.** Yet it is not even that clear that Peña Nieto's proposals would really do much to bring about a safer [Mexico](http://www.insightcrime.org/component/tags/tag/9-mexico" \t "_blank). The most controversial of his ideas is the mando unico. This isn't even the first time [Mexico](http://www.insightcrime.org/component/tags/tag/9-mexico" \t "_blank) has considered such a change: President Felipe Calderon[proposed a similar measure](http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/714407.html" \t "_blank) in 2010, and [CONTINUED[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pena-nieto-proposal-municipal-police-reform-mexico)](http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pena-nieto-proposal-municipal-police-reform-mexico) to advocate for a mando unico for much of his presidency. Various states and metro areas have debated such a move, and some, like [Nuevo Leon](http://www.televisamonterrey.tv/noticias/2645-nuevo-leon-va-avanzado-en-mando-unico" \t "_blank), have moved ahead with its implementation. And [Peña Nieto himself has previously called](http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/estancado-mando-unico-de-policia-bajo-pena-nieto) for states to pursue such a model. At first glance, the logic behind the mando unico proposal is unassailable. Municipal police departments are often dens of corruption, with entire forces at the service of a local criminal boss. **Doing away with the municipal police** could theoretically make it harder for criminal groups to [SECURE[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pena-nieto-proposal-municipal-police-reform-mexico)](http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pena-nieto-proposal-municipal-police-reform-mexico) the support of vast swaths of the state. But there are several problems with that facile conclusion. One **is** that as bad as the municipal police can be, federal and state police officers are often [just as guilty](http://insyde.org.mx/portfolio/diagnostico-de-la-policia-municipal-de-la-montana-de-guerrero/" \t "_blank) of corruption. And that makes sense: there is no inherent reason that an officer paid by a city government would be more susceptible to a crooked payoff than one paid by a state government. Phasing out municipal police departments may look like a way to attack the problem at its source, but **granting the state authority over local policing does nothing to alter the incentive structure that has led so many Mexican police to work for organized crime.** Neither is it clear **who would staff these new, larger state police forces.** If **there is no new recruitment drive and the reform is only a change of uniform for the existing officers**, then the case for the mando unico is undermined still further. Similar mistakes have crippled past police reforms.

1. CP has to go through congress, which is part and parcel with the corrupt system. **The Economist 14’**[**[1]**](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#14cd24f06f49e7f9__ftn1)

The president announced several initiatives to combat corruption and improve transparency, but there will be widespread doubt about how effective they will be. The **first problem is** that **they[’]** wi**ll have to go through a Congress**riddled **with conflicts of interest,** not least **because politicians have to raise** piles of **unauthorised money to get elected**, and **lawmakers almost always water down any proposal that threatens their money supply.** The second problem is that Mr Peña’s own political ethics have been in question over a house his wife intended to buy from a developer who has won numerous public contracts. That makes it harder for him to lead by example.  Undoubtedly some of the points he mentioned are a step in the direction of law and order, and could complement the economic reforms he has orchestrated in his first two years in office. A few months ago, they might even have been considered bold. Predictably, big business lobbyists quickly put their voice behind them.  But something in the mood among the country’s rank and file has changed since the students went missing. It is as if the country has drawn a sinister connection between the drug barons who abducted the students and the entire political class, and see them as two sides of the same coin marked with three words: corruption, lawlessness and impunity. This may be excessively cynical. But in failing even to acknowledge that such a mood now exists, Mr Peña risks continuing to look out of touch—as he has since the crisis started.

1. Empirics go aff- centralization is inferior to decentralization. Walker 14’[[2]](https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/" \l "14cd24f06f49e7f9__ftn2" \o ")

Ostrom, who would later win a [Nobel Prize in economics](http://reason.com/blog/2012/06/12/elinor-ostrom-scholar-who-ma" \t "_blank), decided to put the arguments to an empirical test. The results helped convince her that **highly centralized government was inferior to** what she called "polycentric" **systems, in which political units of varying size can cooperate but act independently,** without a clear hierarchy. She felt **this idea applied to the police as much as anyone else**: While economies of scale might make it sensible for, say, a single crime lab to serve a large region, she felt it would be better for that lab to contract with many relatively small departments than to be an arm of one big one. In the [first study](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2110474?sid=21104876340781&uid=3739256&uid=4&uid=2" \t "_blank), published in 1973, Ostrom and the political scientist Gordon Whitaker took advantage of a natural experiment in Indiana. When **Indianapolis and Marion County consolidated into a single government**, dubbed Unigov, some towns in the county maintained a separate identity with their own services**.** Ostrom and Whitaker **[the study] compared three** of those **towns with three Indianapolis neighborhoods of a similar size and demographics**, going beyond the standard measures of police performance to survey residents on a range of questions about their experiences with law enforcement. **They found that the smaller, locally controlled forces outperformed their big-city counterpart on most measures** and did about the same on the others. **A host of similar studies** around the country **followed**, some conducted by Ostrom and some not. **All of them reached similar conclusions.** Two of those follow-ups are particularly relevant to the issues raised this year in Ferguson. In [one paper](https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=15411" \t "_blank), Ostrom and Whitaker looked specifically at policing in predominantly black communities. The literature that already existed showed a great deal of black dissatisfaction with the police, part of it related to brutality and racial harassment and part to insufficient control of real crimes. With that in mind, the scholars went to Cook County, Illinois, where they compared three neighborhoods in the City of Chicago to a pair of nearby black villages with very small, largely part-time police departments. The residents here turned out to be less satisfied with their small-town forces than the residents in Indiana had been. But the Chicago police scored even more poorly (and were also more costly). So the same basic pattern replicated itself: Citizens still preferred the locally controlled cops to the larger department, albeit with less enthusiasm. Obviously, a lot of time has passed since these studies were conducted; much has surely changed since the '70s. (It's worth noting that one of the black townships that Ostrom and Whitaker studied in Cook County—the village then known as East Chicago Heights and now as Ford Heights—recently [replaced](http://abc7chicago.com/archive/6095027/" \t "_blank) its police force with county-provided patrols.) But all three papers provide strong evidence against the idea that solving our police woes requires some sort of great urban merger. When people argue for centralized systems, they are comparing the warts-and-all world of a cash-strapped suburb to a professionalized ideal that large city governments rarely meet in practice. At any rate, you hardly need a big city-county consolidation to get rid of a small unit that isn't performing well. There was a time when St. Louis County had even more municipalities, reaching a peak of 98 of them in the '50s. Since then, several towns have dissolved themselves without forcing the entire region to combine. Albert O. Hirschman famously [identified](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0674276604/reasonmagazineA/" \t "_blank) two major ways people can influence an institution, *voice* and *exit*. Consolidation weakens both tools: **The larger electorate makes it harder for a single voter's voice to be heard, and the larger territory makes it harder to escape bad governance by exiting to a different burgh down the road.** The problem in Missouri—well, one of the problems—is that small towns have found their own way to evade both voice and exit, through a method we might call *piracy*. With speed traps, high court fees, and similar mechanisms, they put a lot of the weight of funding themselves on the backs of people merely passing through town.

Prefer it- Walker indicates that the consensus of the literature indicates decentralization is preferable so I outweigh on consensus.

AT Corcoran- Wages not sufficient to solve

1. Corcoran concludes that wages are necessary but not sufficient to solve. Aff is not competitive with other methods- there is no DA to doing living wage as it is a step in the right direction. He indicates that we must increase pay along with other taking out other methods. That's a reason you’d affirm there’s at least a risk of offense.
2. Your author concedes wages might be the root cause of all alt causes- Corcoran 11’ [[31]](#footnote-31)

**The salary can**, of course, **feed into other factors** as well; **a poorly paid police** force **is not likely to have a high level of morale** and esprit de corps**, which makes offices less likely to resist entreaties from criminals. This leads to** a [GENERAL[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pay-rises-alone-wont-break-chain-of-police-corruption)](http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/pay-rises-alone-wont-break-chain-of-police-corruption) **climate of corruption, which makes more likely that an honest police officer would face pressure from his colleagues for turning down offers of illicit cash**, and less likely that offending officers would be nabbed for wrongdoing.

AT the Guardian- higher wages encourage corruption

1. This study is specific to legislative representatives- nothing to do with the police.
2. Mexico isn’t included in the study so absolutely no chance it applies. It only includes Spain, Switzerland, France, Sweden, UK, New Zealand, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Canada, US, Italy, Australia, and Japan.
3. Very, very weak correlation your author writes

There is a **correlation**, although **[is] not a very strong** one (a p-value of 0.0143 for the statistically inclined - anything less than 0.05 is considered significant). Italy provides the clearest example, receiving the worst score for corruption and demonstrating the biggest discrepancy between MPs salaries and national income. It seems we have reason to be concerned that higher wages may not attract individuals with the best credentials on corruption. But given that the correlation is so weak and that **there are so many other factors which are relevant here (**not least the legislation that holds policy makers to [ACCOUNT[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2013/jul/01/do-higher-mps-wages-encourage-corruption)](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2013/jul/01/do-higher-mps-wages-encourage-corruption)) a £10,000 pay rise is unlikely to make British politicians as squeaky clean as Denmark's or as corrupt as Somalia's - the least and most corrupt countries in the world [ACCORDING[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2013/jul/01/do-higher-mps-wages-encourage-corruption)](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2013/jul/01/do-higher-mps-wages-encourage-corruption) to Transparency International

AT Sabet- Squo solves

#### Don’t even try to leverage this ev. He affirms.

Sabet 10**[[32]](#footnote-32)**

Recognizing the failure of the limiting discretion approach, more recent reforms have sought to ¶ produce police forces deserving of the authority and discretion necessary to be effective. These ¶ include a wide range of reforms, such as raising salaries **and benefits,** improving recruitment **and ¶ selection criteria,** elevating training **times and standards,** offering specialized training**, ¶** developing and certifying operational procedures**,** offering a system of merit based promotion**, ¶** vetting officers, and creating and strengthening accountability mechanisms **and oversight.**

Doesn’t matter if these reforms are already happening we should continue them.

AT Judicial system must be reformed as well

1. This permutation is just true – there is absolutely no reason we can’t do both.

(not even bothering to look for evidence because the perm is true)

1. Police reform is key to overall judicial reform. Seelke 13’[[33]](#footnote-33)

There have also been some operational challenges in states that have implemented the new system. A reluctance to use plea bargaining and to refer even simple cases to ADR is overwhelming the court systems in some states.40 **Weak police** and prosecutorial **capacity to gather** the type of **evidence required to build strong cases**, combined with various institutions’ unwillingness to work together, **has kept conviction rates low.41 Courts are** particularly **illequipped to handle large numbers of serious crimes.** For example, due to capacity constraints, Chihuahua can only process a few hundred homicide cases each year. The prosecution rate for homicide has actually declined in that state in recent years.

Pre-requisite to judicial reform is reform in the way criminals are caught- we have to start earlier in the system.

**Impact Defense**

AT corruption good for econ.

Turn: Corruption is terrible for the economy. 5 warrants Stephenson 14’ [[34]](#footnote-34)

Most experts think that **[first] private investment (**both foreign and domestic) **is important for growth.** There’s plenty of evidence that **corruption has a strong negative effect on investment, operating like a particularly inefficient**[**TAX[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)**](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)**that reduces the amount and efficient allocation of private investment** — though recent research has also suggested that the impact of corruption on investment is much worse in some regions than in others: Check out papers [here](http://people.ku.edu/~asiedu/Corruption-RDE.pdf" \o "Asiedu & Freeman" \t "_blank), [here,](http://ijeronline.com/documents/volumes/Vol2issue2/ijer20110202(11).pdf" \o "Das & Parry" \t "_blank)[here](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/497010" \o "Egger & Winner" \t "_blank), [here,](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0261560609000084/1-s2.0-S0261560609000084-main.pdf?_tid=db789520-cb22-11e3-84f0-00000aacb360&acdnat=1398283818_e0a423dbbfc18daa7cc640e56b0daf2a" \o "Javorcik & Wei" \t "_blank)[here](http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/wp2012/WP2012-027.pdf" \o "O'Toole & Tarp" \t "_blank), [here](http://polymer.bu.edu/hes/articles/psnis08.pdf" \o "Podobnik et al." \t "_blank), and [here](http://users.nber.org/~wei/data/wei2000a/wei2000a.pdf" \o "Wei" \t "_blank). What about education? Most of us think **[second] education is important for development** and poverty reduction, as well as an intrinsically valuable development objective, [CORRECT[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)? **Corruption in the education sector is a huge problem, and has a substantial adverse effect on education outcomes.** See papers [here](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDgQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ccsenet.org%2Fjournal%2Findex.php%2Fijef%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F16507%2F10992&ei=-B9YU7G2CpKiyASIzoDoBA&usg=AFQjCNHnc3LpsZZ3S1iAzgjHPLEjMt1_Iw&sig2=2ntiQ-667VHG3wXpo1sYcA&bvm=bv.65397613,d.aWw" \o "DiPietro et al." \t "_blank), [here](http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62352/1/717987531.pdf" \o "Ferraz et al." \t "_blank), [here](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00116.pdf" \o "Gupta et al." \t "_blank), [here](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0047272711000223/1-s2.0-S0047272711000223-main.pdf?_tid=00b981e4-cb25-11e3-a3a3-00000aab0f01&acdnat=1398284733_b6afd6acb6b9c0359979302cbdccd569" \o "Reinikka & Svensson" \t "_blank), [here](http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/089533006776526058" \o "Chaudhury et al." \t "_blank), and [here](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00074918.2012.654485" \o "Suryadarma" \t "_blank). And then there’s **[third] health – another** intrinsic **development goal**, as well as a contributor to poverty reduction and other desired development outcomes. Again, **corruption** in the health sector is rampant, and **leads to substantial adverse effects on actual health outcomes** — though in the very poorest, least healthy countries, simple [INCOME[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/) improvements may matter more than governance improvements. See studies [here](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp00116.pdf" \o "Gupta et al." \t "_blank), [here](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10101-006-0031-y" \l "page-1" \o "Azfar & Gurgur" \t "_blank), [here](http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/089533006776526058" \o "Chaudhury et al." \t "_blank), [here](http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2F4732_0F3BBA1AF9B5F476D720597CB4931DAE_journals__HEP_HEP6_04_S174413311000023Xa.pdf&cover=Y&code=5d9fab2a7de633cea69d566e33aeaf5e" \o "Holmberg & Rothstein" \t "_blank), [here](http://www.cgdev.org/files/5967_file_WP_78.pdf" \o "Lewis" \t "_blank), and[here](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13504850600721916" \o "Lazarova & Mosca" \t "_blank). Think **[fourth] public investment in** things like **infrastructure and other public goods is a crucial for development**?Most experts do. And **corruption leads to significant inefficiencies in such investment**: see [here,](http://perso.uclouvain.be/david.delacroix/pdfpubli/ecogov09.pdf" \o "de la Croix & Delavallade" \t "_blank)[here](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/rest.89.3.566" \o "Keefer & Knack" \t "_blank), [here](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003893" \o "Cordis" \t "_blank), and[here](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02761488" \l "page-1" \o "Delavallade" \t "_blank). And what about the **[fifth]** [**SECURITY[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)**](http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/)**of property rights** — one of the factors that Blattman says dwarfs corruption in its significance for development? Turns out that **public corruption undermines the security of property rights — partly because corruption drives firms and entrepreneurs into the unofficial economy** (see [here](http://pages.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/project/academic/unofficial%20economy%20by%20friedman%20et%20al.pdf" \o "Friedman et al." \t "_blank) and [here](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0047272799000948/1-s2.0-S0047272799000948-main.pdf?_tid=114a3482-cba1-11e3-b0ad-00000aab0f01&acdnat=1398338019_82a3f0126a009e966ca8a30b9e0bd058" \o "Johnson et al." \t "_blank)).

Prefer my evidence- it cites 23 studies that prove empirically the effects that corruption has on various aspects of the economy.

Turn: Corruption in Mexico Specifically stops growth. Archibold 12’[[35]](#footnote-35) writes

Fiscal watchdogs chafe at the way bribery and other forms of **corruption** are taken in stride here. Studies have [FOUND[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/americas/bribery-tolerated-even-as-it-hurts-mexican-economy.html)](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/americas/bribery-tolerated-even-as-it-hurts-mexican-economy.html) it **costs the economy upward of $114 billion — 10 percent of its gross domestic product** — and dampens potential investment The Mexican chapter of Transparency International said corruption over all was on the rise in [Mexico](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) and last year ranked it 100 out of 183 countries in its perception of corruption index, and last among the 34 countries in the [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/o/organization_for_economic_cooperation_and_development/index.html?inline=nyt-org). [**A study**](http://mexico.gfintegrity.org/en/) in January by Global Financial Integrity, a research group in Washington, **said Mexico** over all **had lost $872 billion between 1970 to 2010 to crime, corruption and** [**TAX[http://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/americas/bribery-tolerated-even-as-it-hurts-mexican-economy.html)**](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/world/americas/bribery-tolerated-even-as-it-hurts-mexican-economy.html) **evasion,** with an acceleration of losses since the North American Free Trade Agreement began in 1994 and ushered in a wave of foreign investment.

AT Corruption promotes societal cooperation

Turn- corruption undermines authority in Mexico. Morris 11**[[36]](#footnote-36)**

To reiterate, the prevailing patterns of corruption associated with drug tra3cking and organized crime not only facilitate the illicit businesses of these organizations, but also e4ectively handicap o3cial state e4orts to control or contain them. Part and parcel of the weaknesses of **Mexico’s** institutions of justice, **corruption strips the state of its capacity to enforce** the rule of **law**, gather and e4ectively use intelligence, carry out investigative and forensic work, make arrests, and prosecute members of criminal organizations or corrupt state o3cials: in short, to employ the justice system to provide security and accountability. Furthermore, **corruption undermines the public’s trust in the government and thus prevents the state from receiving the level of cooperation needed from society for effective law enforcement.** 5us, because of corruption, when 6ghting criminals, the state must also 6ght parts of itself.30 Understanding the prevailing corrupt bargain is a critical point in understanding both the tools at Calderón’s disposal when he launched the 2006 war and the dynamics that war unleashed

Outweighs: A. Specificity- my evidence is specific to Mexico so it is more likely to be correct, ignore their generic evidence. B. Their evidence indicates that governments won’t do their jobs without power incentives, but government power doesn’t exist absent people’s trust.

AT Cartels are good for econ.

Cartels are terrible for the economy. Robles et al[[37]](#footnote-37)

The   cost   of   violence   includes   both   tangible   and   intangible   cots.   **The   tangible   costs   include   all   activities  related  to  the  prevention  of  and  punishment  for  violence,**  such  as  investments,  expenditures,   and   material   losses,   as   well   as   the   cost   of   carrying   out   activities   that   identify   and   punish   those   who   commit  crimes  that  contribute  to  the  violence. **The  intangible  costs**are  more  difficult  to  value  because   they **include** estimates   of   the   victims’   decreased   quality   of   life   (CICAD   and   OAS,   2010;   McCollister,   French  and  Fang,  2010), **changes  in  behavior,  and  other  personal  traumas**(Soares,  2009),  and  the  loss  of   interpersonal  trust  and  social  capital  because  of  fear  and  loss  of  order  and  freedom.Estimating   the   cost   of   violence   is   a   complex   exercise,   especially   for   the   intangible   costs   that   cannot  easily  be  assigned  a  value.  The  vast  majority  of  studies  only   focus  on  the  tangible  costs,  with  a   wide  range  of  results.10    Kahn   (1999)  and  Velasco  and  Andrade   (2003)  use  a  method  of  accounting   for   estimated  costs  of  violence  in  São  Paulo  and  Belo  Horizonte,  Brazil.  Also  on  Brazil,  the  **World**Bank  uses  a   panel  to  study  the  impact  of  violent  crime  rates  (approximations  of  the  homicide  rates)  on  the  economy   in   general.   The   **report   estimates   that   a   reduction   of   10   homicides   per   100,000   people   produces   an   increase  in   the  GDP  per  capita  of  between  0.7  and  2.9%**during   the  next   five  years,  depending  on   the   specifications  used.

Empirics confirm- cartels kill econ. Robles et al 2

This  study  argues  that  the  **violent  competition  between  rival  drug  organizations  has  a  negative   effect  on  the  economy.**To  understand  the  mechanism,  we  use  the  analogy  of  Olson  (2001)  to **imagine   the  cartels  as  “stationary”  or  “roving  bandits”  depending  on  how   they  decide   to  integrate   themselves   into   society.   “Stationary   bandits**,”   or   benefactors,   **have   the   ability   to   maintain   control   over** their **territories**over  the  **long  term  and**therefore **have  incentives  to  reduce  predatory  behavior**as  they  look   towards   greater   **[for] longterm   gains.   “Roving   bandits”   have   temporary** or   uncertain   **control   over   their   territory,  which   induces   them   to  extract   rents  and   resources   from   the   community  at   the   highest   rate** possible  through  extortion,  robbery,  and  other  crimes,  to  maximize  short-­‐term  gain. The   main   argument   of   this   study   is   that  the   war   between   cartels   for   control   over   certain   trafficking   routes   has   been   matched   by   a   substantial   increase   in   violence   and   petty   crime,   including   theft,   extortion,   and   kidnapping.  Faced   with   increased   competition,   cartels   have   incentives   to   turn   against  society  due  to  the  need  for  greater  resources  to  maintain  their  armed  conflicts,  and  because  of  a   need  to  intimidate  or  punish  members  of  rival  organizations,  as  well  as  to exploit  new  opportunities  for   opportunistic crime. Following  the  above  argument,  and  due  to  the  nature  of  drug-­‐related  violence,  we  can  assume   that   this   type   of   violence   has   no   linear   effect   on   economic   performance,   but   instead   that   there   is   a   threshold   after   which   violence   causes   economic   activity   to   significantly   shrink.  Below   this   turf-­‐war   threshold,  many  individuals  and  companies  can  internalize  any  increased  costs  resulting  from  the  need   for   enhanced   security   and   protection   depending   on   their   economic size   and   capacity.   However,   said   adjustments  have  effects  on   the  labor  market,  both  in   the   supply  and  demand,  and  we  can  expect   to   find   a   marginal   effect   of   violence   on   this   area.   Once   the   violence   levels   have   passed   into   the   war   threshold,  companies  and  individuals  begin  to  change  their  actions  in  both  the  medium  and  long  term,   including   their  location,  investments,  and  production,  in   the  case  of  commercial  enterprises,  and   their   participation  in   the  labor  market  and  choice  of  profession,  in   the  case  of  individuals.  We  can  expect  a   significant   contraction   in   economic   activity   in   this   range   of   violence   that   might   not   be   adequately   captured  with  a  linear  relationship  model  between  economic  activity  and  violence.**In   our   study   we   used   two   empirical   strategies  to   estimate** both   the   marginal   **effects** and   the   “threshold”  effects  **of  violence  on  economic**activity  and  labor. To  estimate  the  marginal  effects,  we  did an   instrumental   variable   regression   utilizing   exogenous   variation   of cocaine   seizures   in   Colombia   to   instrument  for  violence.  This  variable  was  interacted  with  the  distance  of  a  municipality  from  principle   points   of   entry.  **We   found   substantial   negative   effects   on   labor  market   participation,   unemployment,   decision  to  start  a  company,  and  income.** To  estimate  the short-­‐term  and  medium-­‐term effects  of  crossing  the  turf-­‐war threshold on  the   economy,   we  made   use   of  synthetic   control   group  methodology consisting   of   building   counterfactual   scenarios  by  creating optimal  weighted  units  of  control.  We  used  the  close  correlation  between  GDP  and   electricity  consumption   to  estimate   the  effect  of  violence  on  economic  activity  at   the  municipal  level.   **We   found   that** those   **municipalities   that   saw   dramatic   increases   in   violence   between   2006   and   2010   significantly  reduced  their  energy  consumption  in  the  years  after  treatment.**

Prefer my evidence- it uses a “threshold” calculation for effects of violence on economy rather than a linear one, which is more accurate for studies of criminal violence.

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